![]() ![]() Based on this, the theoretical values of Lyapunov exponent at Nash equilibrium point and its change process with the main parameters' changes are analyzed and simulated, afterwards the complex dynamic phenomena, such as the bifurcation, chaos, and attractors are discussed, and so on. ![]() Second, the existence and stability of equilibrium points about the model are discussed. First, it established a price game model for three oligarchs with different rationality. This article mainly researches the dynamic and repeated games among different competitors and the influences when different competitors have different behaviors on the game process, and then put forward the corresponding control strategy. And the reality is that all the oligarchs may not have the same rationality or decision rules. The property insurance market in China has always been with three-oligopoly market structure, that is, the competition among the oligarchs is mainly a three-dimensional game. The results have significant theoretical and practical application value. Based on this, we used the variable feedback control method to control the chaos of the system and stabilized the chaos state to Nash equilibrium point again. Finally, we analyzed the influences which the changes of different parameters have on the profits and utilities of oligarchs and their corresponding competition advantage. Third, we studied the theoretical value of Lyapunov exponent at Nash equilibrium point and its change process with the main parameters' changes though having numerical simulation for the system such as the bifurcation, chaos attractors, and so on. Then, we discussed the existence and stability of equilibrium points. Combining with the actual competition in Chinese property insurance market and assuming that the property insurance companies take the marginal utility maximization as the basis of decision-making when they play price games, we first established the price game model with three oligarchs who have different rationalities.
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |